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The Dialogue between Biomedicine and Law in an “IntraAmerican Transnational 
Perspective” 
 
Charles H. Baron 
Professor of Law Boston College Law School 
 
 
 As I have in the past, I wish to talk today about the dialogue between biomedicine 
and law from the perspective of the American legal system.  I do so because I believe that 
perspective may well be helpful in the effort to develop a response to the challenges 
presented by Judge Santosuosso in his seminal JIBL article
1
 – the challenges, particularly 
in Europe, of the increasing resort to transnational legal standards in dealing with 
biomedical issues. 
 
 In many ways, the American legal system is “transnational.”  The fifty states are 
each sovereign in their ability to regulate by law.  Each has its own constitution and a 
supreme judicial body which is empowered to render authoritative interpretations of its 
state law – including its state constitutional law.  The United States Constitution imposes 
no obligation on the states to achieve uniformity in legal regulation.  Indeed, the 
individual American states have been celebrated as “laboratories of jurisprudence” where 
“a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”2  And yet, 
lawmakers in every state draw upon the laws of their sister states for guidance in the 
framing of their own laws and regulations.  This includes, most significantly, state 
judges, who cite the decisions of judges in other states as sources of “persuasive 
authority” when they develop case law for their own states. 
 
 During the nineteenth century, when American society was being challenged by 
the technological developments of that era, e.g., the railroad, the telegraph, and mass-
production and national distribution of goods by large corporations, American state 
courts worked in dialogue with each other to establish a body of fairly uniform principles 
of case law that responded to and facilitated those changes.  While each state court had 
the power to prescribe such rules only for its own sovereign state, the Anglo-American 
common law tradition provided a strong justification for the export and import of rules 
between states.  Lord Coke’s notion of the common law being “fined and refined by an 
infinite number of grave and learned men”3 encouraged judges to look for inspiration to 
any source of good legal reasoning for assistance in deciding the cases before them.   
 
 This process was significantly accelerated toward the end of the century when 
Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell established the “case system” as the fundamental 
method of law study at Harvard Law School.  Under this system, students were not 
                                               
1 Amedeo Santosuosso, The Worldwide Law-Making Process in the Field of Science and Law:  A 
Laboratory Bench (IBLARC), 6 JIBL 1 (2009). 
2 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis dissent.) 
3 SIR EDWARD COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 97b (Charles Butler ed., 18th ed., Legal Classics 
Library 1985) (1628). 
lectured on the law by their professors, they were required to pore over raw legal 
opinions and come to class prepared to critique them, compare them, and, through 
dialogue with their professors and fellow students, attempt to draw from them systematic 
principles of the various fields of law being studied.  The cases were chosen for their 
pedagogical value and could be from any state.  Harvard increasingly attracted law 
students from across the country and purported to be a “national law school” teaching 
“national law.”  The basic principles of the law of contracts, property, and torts that the 
students were piecing together in their classrooms were, at one and the same time, the 
law of every American jurisdiction (except, perhaps, Louisiana, whose law drew in part 
on the French civil system) and no American jurisdiction.  They were supposed to 
represent what was basic to the common law, not the detailed system of law of any 
particular state. 
 
 When students trained by the case system at Harvard (and the other law schools 
that began to follow Harvard’s lead) were admitted to practice in states across America, 
they took with them their “national law” attitudes and argued their cases in terms that 
often drew on what were thought to be the better decisions of other states.  They also 
gradually became the judges who decided such cases and the legal scholars who 
attempted to organize case law into principles that systematized and improved the law.  
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., one of the most famous and influential judges of the era 
(Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1899-1902, Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States 1902-1932) had been for a short time a 
professor at the Harvard Law School and had authored (in 1881) “The Common Law,” a 
ground-breaking book in which he applied the philosophical approach of American 
Pragmatism to a careful study of Anglo-American law.  In it, and in later speeches and 
articles, he promoted the view that the only source of law, properly speaking, was judicial 
decisions.  “The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more 
pretentious, are what I mean by the law,” he famously said in “The Path of the Law”4 – 
his address to students at Boston University Law School in 1897.  By this, he meant not 
to promote cynicism, but to inspire a spirit of reform.  If judges and lawyers approached 
the common law as a human artifact – designed to deal with the problems of the times 
when the decisions were made but, in some cases, no longer capable of usefully resolving 
modern disputes, they could engage in a dialogue that attempted to frame new, more 
appropriate and useful rules of law while remaining true to fundamental principles. 
 
 Holmes’ views were shared in varying degrees by a growing body of legal 
scholars.  Legal treatises increasingly tended to be organized around collections of 
judicial opinions that the author struggled to organize into a body of consistent legal 
principles.  Often, they pushed reform efforts as well – by choosing the “better” lines of 
cases where there was conflict or suggesting directions in which the law should move.  
This effort reached a new level of magnitude in 1923 with the founding of the American 
Law Institute (ALI).  Its creation had been recommended by a Committee on the 
Establishment of a Permanent Organization for Improvement of Law – a very 
distinguished group chaired by Elihu Root (a practicing lawyer as well as a statesman and 
1912 Nobel Peace Prize recipient) that numbered among its members such well known 
                                               
4 O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897). 
intellectual judges as Benjamin Cardozo (then Chief Justice of the New York Court of 
Appeals and later Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States) and 
Learned Hand (then a Judge of the United States District Court for the District of New 
York but appointed in 1924 to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) 
and highly respected scholars such as Harvard Law Professor Samuel Williston, who was 
the author of the leading treatise on contract law. 
 
 The stated mission of the ALI was “to promote the clarification and simplification 
of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of 
justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work.”  Its first 
project, completed in 1944, was a comprehensive “Restatement of the Law” covering the 
subjects of Agency, Conflict of Laws, Contracts, Judgments, Property, Restitution, 
Security, Torts, and Trusts.  They were so-called because, although they often made 
value choices between conflicting lines of authority, they purported to be, at base, efforts 
to simply “restate” in definitive, clear “black letter” rules the common law principles the 
authors distilled from American judicial decisions and to present them in a systematized 
organization resembling a legal code.  Each restated area of the law is divided into 
numbered chapters and subdivided into topics, titles, and sections.  Statements of black 
letter law are followed by comments written by the drafters for the purpose of explaining 
the provision and identifying its limitations.  They are also illustrated by examples 
showing how a particular provision would apply to specific fact situations.  Later 
restatements have been accompanied also by “Reporter’s Notes” that give a history of the 
provision and cite to the authority from which the rule has been developed.  Over time, 
these provisions have increasingly found themselves accepted as secondary sources of the 
law and cited in lawyers’ briefs and judge’s opinions alongside decisions from sister 
states.   
 
 Early on, the ALI developed a cooperative relationship with the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.  The NCCUSL shares many of 
the goals of the ALI, but it seeks to achieve them in a significantly different fashion.  It 
also comprises lawyers, judges, and legal scholars, but all of its members are chosen by 
the governors or legislative leaders of the states that are members of the organization.  
The charge of the organization is the drafting of uniform state laws which, it is hoped, 
will be enacted in one form or another by the legislatures of all, or at least a significant 
number of, the American states.  Starting with just seven states at its founding in 1892, 
the NCCUSL achieved representation of every state by 1912 and now includes 
representation as well from the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto 
Rico.  As of this writing, the organization has drafted a total of 113 recommended 
uniform laws (some updated in one or more later editions).  These drafts have received 
very varied receptions by the state legislatures.  As might be expected, the most widely 
adopted have been those that cover areas where multi-state activities place a high 
premium on uniformity of regulation.  Undoubtedly the most successful is the 1952 
Uniform Commercial Code -- which was the result of many years of labor performed by 
some of America’s leading legal scholars under the aegis of both the ALI and the 
NCCUSL.  It has been enacted (with some mostly minor variations) in all of the 50 states, 
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam.  The ALI has 
also drafted one important piece of proposed legislation on its own – the 1962 Model 
Penal Code.  It has been very influential as a basis for replacing and standardizing 
criminal codes in the U.S.  At present, no states have adopted the Model Penal Code in its 
entirety, but substantial portions are represented in the criminal laws of many states. 
 
 I have discussed in detail several times in the past
5
 the fashion in which elements 
of the intra-American “transnational flow of legal standards” described above came 
together in developing law regarding the “right to die.”  Starting in the 1960’s with 
decisions that, at first, denied Jehovah’s Witnesses a religiously-based right to refuse life-
saving blood transfusions, the courts gradually began, in the 1970’s, to develop case law 
that moved in a more libertarian direction and that reached a full-flowering -- as regards 
recognizing a right to choose death by refusing any and all medical treatment -- in the 
1990’s.  At present, the courts of one state, have established as well a right to physician-
assisted suicide.
6
  As sources for writing their decisions, the courts have used not only 
their own state’s case law, constitution, statutes, and regulations, but, also, legal materials 
from other jurisdictions, state, federal, and (occasionally) foreign; books, articles, and 
other materials produced by legal scholars; and expressions of policy by recognized 
professional groups within the American health care industry.  Beginning with California 
in 1976, state legislatures began passing “living will” statutes designed to provide 
patients with the power, through written advance directives, to control treatment 
decisions at a time when they would no longer be competent to do so directly for 
themselves.  As with case law, statutory approaches have changed over time as a function 
of the ongoing national legal dialogue.  The major moves have been from laws that 
enable patients to put in writing what they would want done under varying sets of 
circumstances to laws authorizing the patients, instead, to appoint an agent to make those 
decisions at any time the patient becomes incompetent, to legislation that combines both 
those devices but also automatically appoints a family member to serve as the health care 
agent in a situation where the patient fails to do so. Every state has now adopted one or 
more of such “living will” provisions.  Some states have adopted, in one form or another, 
provisions of three model statutes drafted by the NCUSSL: The Uniform Health-Care 
Decisions Act (1993), The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (1989), and The 
Uniform Health-Care Information Act (1985).  The federal government, which has 
largely stayed out of regulation in this area, did pass, in 1990, the Patient Self-
Determination Act, which requires all institutional health care providers in the United 
States to offer patients information regarding living will options in their state. 
 
 In all other areas of legal regulation of bioscience and medicine in the United 
States, we see, as well, the operation of the intra-American “transnational flow of legal 
standards.”  In the area of organ transplantation, the NCUSSL’s Uniform Anatomical Gift 
Act (2006) and The Uniform Determination of Death Act (1978, 1980) have been very 
influential with state courts as well as with state legislatures.  With respect to abortion, 
the ALI’s Model Penal Code performed great service in the vanguard of efforts to reduce 
                                               
5 See, most recently, C. Baron, Bioethics and Law in the United States: A Legal Process Perspective, 4 
DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMPARATO ED EUROPEO 1653 (2008). 
6 Montana, where the decision is now on appeal to the state’s supreme court. 
the extent of its criminalization before the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade.7  
But, the main engine driving the growth of the law has been, and continues to be, the 
continuing dialogue among the state (and sometimes federal) courts that are forced to 
make decisions in the lawsuits brought by parties who seek legal solutions to the 
biomedical problems with which they are confronted.  Thus, for example, in the 2001 
case of Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc.,
8
 the Supreme Court of Maryland 
developed new law regulating human experimentation when it made medical researchers 
civilly liable to human subjects in an experimental program that did not follow 
appropriate ethical guidelines, in the 1991 case of Moore v. The Regents of The 
University of California,
9
 the Supreme Court of California developed new law regarding 
the right of a patient to be informed of the potential business value of cell lines that were 
extracted from him during medical treatment, and, in a series of cases over the past 
twenty years, state courts have struggled to produce consistent principles dealing with the 
issue of who controls the future of frozen embryos placed and kept in storage for 
reproductive purposes.
10
 
 
 I have argued elsewhere that this judicial activism works well in the United 
States, in part because the undemocratic tendencies of the process are mitigated by the 
power that state legislatures possess to override or modify by statute any and all of the 
substantive principles that result from it.  Moreover, the vast majority of state judges in 
the United States are subject to election of some sort and are thus answerable, at least in 
theory, to the people of the state for the decisions that they render.  And, even in those 
instances where state courts try to insulate court-made law from legislative reversal by 
basing them on state constitutional principle, as was the case in early right to die cases 
such as Quinlan
11
 and Saikewicz,
12
 it is still possible for the people of the state to reverse 
the decision by casting a majority vote in favor of an appropriate constitutional 
amendment at a state election.  As Judge Santosuosso points out in his JIBL article, a 
major criticism of the extension of Anglo-American common law processes to a truly 
transnational flow of legal standards is that it “suffers from a lack of genuinely 
democratic accountability.”  The extent to which this is true when such standards are 
employed by any national domestic court will depend in part on whether the courts of the 
particular nation are subject to similar sorts of popular controls. 
 
 But, likely to be more important to the acceptance of any resort to transnational 
legal standards by domestic courts will be the fashion in which the legal dialogue for and 
against their use in a particular case is conducted.  As we know, judicial borrowing of law 
from non-domestic sources has been criticized as being “like looking out over a crowd 
and picking out your friends.”  In answer to this criticism, Judge Santosuosso has pointed 
to the behavior of scientists, who would be embarrassed not to consider all relevant 
                                               
7 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
8 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001). 
9 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991). 
10 See, for example, Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) cert. denied sub nom Stowe v. Davis, 
507 U.S. 911 (1993); Kass v. Kass, 695 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); J.B. v. M.B. & C.C., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 
2001); and Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d (2006).  
11 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
12 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977). 
elements of the world-wide body of scientific knowledge in building and assessing their 
own experiments.  This body of knowledge may, like transnational law, contain elements 
which are inconsistent with each other but which, despite that tension, may all play a role 
in the search for truth.  “[F]rom a very practical point of view, we could say that if even a 
scientific inconsistent theory can be empirically successful and play a legitimate role in 
science, then also legal standards and rules, which are less familiar with mathematically 
sound theories, have a chance to work and act in the international arena, of course under 
the rational scrutiny of the community of jurists, lawmakers, judges and citizens.”13  But, 
the analogy here breaks down if the scrutiny of the legal community is based upon reason 
alone – not employing as well adequate means for judging whether borrowed norms have 
been empirically successful in the jurisdiction from which they have been borrowed and 
whether they are likely to be empirically successful in the jurisdiction into which they are 
being borrowed. 
 
 Here, again, Justice Holmes shines a guiding light on our subject.  “For the 
rational study of the law,” he advised law students in 1897,” the blackletter man may be 
the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of 
economics.”14  In the one hundred and twelve years since he made that prediction, there 
has been some progress in the United States regarding the availability and proper usage 
of social science data for measuring the “empirical success” of laws, but, alas, it is still 
largely true that the lawyer or judge who has mastery of such data is “the man of the 
future.”  An attempt to discuss the extent of, and reasons for, that modest progress in the 
United States must be the project of another talk at another time.  But, I would like to end 
by urging the importance of exploring the question of how such data can be developed 
and made available transnationally as a critical piece of the ongoing process of 
development and adoption of transnational legal norms. 
                                               
13 Santosuosso, The Worldwide Law Making Process, at 8. 
14 Holmes, The Path of the Law, at 469. 
